Giants in CST: Msgr. John Ryan on Industrial Democracy

“Industrial Democracy” 

Democracy means rule by the people.  As we all know, it generally describes a popular rule in political government.  A democratic state is one in which the people make and execute the laws, either directly, or through elected representatives.  Its opposite is an autocratic state, in which government is in the hands of a king, who either rules alone, or with the assistance of a small, privileged class.  Both the king and the privileged, or aristocratic group obtain their political power by inheritance, not by commission from the people. 

Democracy in industry, or industrial democracy, carries over the idea of popular rule from the political field to the industrial field.  In general, it means direction and control of industry by the people.  At least, that is the significance of the words themselves.  In actual use, the phrase has many and various significations.  At the one extreme, it has been used as a synonym of Socialism, or Collectivism; at the other extreme, it has been applied to collective bargaining.  In other words, some persons understand by industrial democracy the ownership and operation of the instruments of production by the democratic state, the democratic government, the people acting through their political representatives; while other persons apply the phrase to that arrangement by which the workers, through their chosen representatives, have a share in making the labor contract, and in determining the conditions of employment.  Those who use the term in the former sense are Socialists; those who use it in the latter sense are trade unionists.

Neither of these uses of industrial democracy is necessarily wrong.  A Socialist organization of industry would be government of industry by the people, at least ultimately and fundamentally.  Determination of wages, hours, and other employment conditions, is partial popular government of industry within certain limits; that is, with regard to the labor contract.  Such popular control through the labor union does not touch the ownership of the instruments of production, nor the direction of industrial operations.  Nevertheless, it includes a degree of industrial operations.

As the term has come to be used, therefore, industrial democracy is a relative thing.  It means, or may mean, simply a greater degree of popular control than has heretofore existed in our industrial system.  In every use of the phrase, however, popular control means control by the employees, or wage-earners.  This is seen even in the mildest acceptation of the phrase, namely, the sense in which hit is used by trade unionists.

The industrial democracy that I intend to discuss is considerably less than Socialism, and considerably more than collective bargaining, or trade union agreements.  Socialism is impracticable and undesirable.  Collective bargaining is insufficient.  Socialism is now accepted by such a small number of persons that it does not come within the scope of practical consideration.  The vast majority of American wage-earners do not believe in Socialism, and are very unlikely to accept it in the near future.  On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the members of trade unions are apparently satisfied with that degree of industrial democracy which is embraced in the concept of collective bargaining.  In my opinion, this amount of industrial democracy is inadequate, either to protect the interests of the wage-earners, to secure industrial efficiency, or to safeguard industrial peace.  It is not a solution, even a temporary solution, of our greatest industrial problem.

Trade unionism, even though it include all the control which the most thorough conception of collective bargaining can comprehend, cannot give adequate protection to the masses of the wage-earners.  It has never been extended to more than a small minority of all those who work for wages, and I is not likely to take in the majority for a long time to come.  At least there is nothing in the present trend of industrial relations to indicate that the majority will become members of the labor unions in the next twenty-five years.

Even if all the wage-earners were now organized, the methods and policies of the labor union would not bring about industrial efficiency or industrial peace.  The reason for this is to be found in the industrial antagonisms which would necessarily follow complete organization of labor into unions.  From its very nature, the labor union is a fighting organization.  Its primary aim is to secure for its members a larger share of the product of industry, and better working conditions in the matter of hours, shop arrangements, etc.  On the other hand, the employer finds it to his interest, or thinks so, to oppose the efforts of the union in all these directions.  Higher wages, a shorter working day and improvement in working conditions mean for the employer reduced profits.  At any rate, that is what he believes, and very often rightly believes.  We need not stop here to consider the “economy of high wages,” nor the general contention that the shorter working day and improved shop conditions are for the interest of the employer, as well as employee.  This theory is true only within certain limits.  Anyhow, it is not accepted by more than a small percent of employers.

Therefore, the trade union meets the employer, or the association of employers, on a basis and in a spirit of combat, not of cooperation.  When the two groups come together for the purpose of making a trade agreement, each strives to gain as much and to concede as little as it can.  Employer and employee have, indeed, certain common interests.  In general, it is good for both that industrial operations should go on without interruption and that the joint product should be as large as possible.  The greater the product, the larger will be the amount to be divided.  Nevertheless, the diversity of interests is more important, or at least always seems so, than the community of interests.  The manner in which the product shall be divided between the two groups seems of much greater consequence than the size of the product.  Hence, when the groups are making a bargain both lay stress upon the division of the product, both emphasize diversity of interests rather than community of interests.  If they fail to agree, there is a strike, with consequent loss to both parties.  If they effect an agreement, one or the other, or both, very often believe that they have not obtained all that was their due.  This condition does not make for industrial contentment, or industrial peace.

From the viewpoint of industrial efficiency, the whole condition may be summed up in the statement that the worker is not interested in his work.  In very many industries, particularly in the great industries owned by corporations, the majority of the employees have little or no thought of the prosperity of the concern that employs them.  What they are interested in primarily, is their jobs.  The fear that if they do not turn out a reasonable amount of work the product will be insufficient to afford them the wages which have been agreed upon, seldom affects them, or determines the rate or quality of their efforts.  They assume that the product will be sufficient to provide their remuneration, and they scarcely ever fear that their employing concern will have to shut down because of their failure to turn out a larger daily product.  The thought that they are fundamentally cooperating with the employer in a common enterprise does not often enter the minds of the workers, or if it does, it has very little influence over their attitude toward their tasks.

The worker’s lack of interest in his work may be considered with advantage from another viewpoint.  In our great urban industries, on the railroads, and in the mines, the industrial population is rather sharply divided into two groups.  On the one hand is a small number of persons who own the instruments of production, and direct their operation.  On the other hand is the vast majority who neither own nor direct.  They merely carry out orders.  Since they do not own and do not direct, they have little or no conscious interest in the fortunes of the concern that employs them.  They are interested only in holding their jobs, and in obtaining the best conditions of employment that they can get from the employer.

If all wage-earners had some hope of becoming owners, or partial owners, of the instruments of production, they would necessarily be interested in something more than their jobs and their working conditions.  If they looked forward to a time when they would share in the ownership of the concern that employs them, they would necessarily be interested in the prosperity of that concern.  If each worker expected to become the owner and director of a business of his own, he would be interested in the success of his employer’s business, because he would be moved by the business man’s viewpoint.  He would look upon his employee function as temporary, as subordinate to, and as a preparation for his function as director of industry.  In such conditions, the diversity of interests between employer and employee would be minimized in the consciousness of both.  Most of the emphasis would be placed upon their common interests.  The employee would be more interested in saving his money, in turning out a larger product, and in acquiring the knowledge necessary for his later activity as an owner and operator of some industry or business.

Many years ago, that psychology and that hope were possessed by a large proportion of American wage-earners.  Indeed, the American industrial tradition has, until comparatively recent years, included the belief that almost any wage-earner, who worked hard, tried to acquire industrial knowledge, and saved  his money, had a solid hope of becoming something more than a wage-earner, long before he reached the end of his working days.  Some twenty years ago, John Mitchell, who was for many years the successful leader of the Mine Workers’ Union, declared that 90% of American wage-earners had reconciled themselves to the prospect of remaining such all their lives.  In effect, Mr. Mitchell declared that the American industrial traditions had ceased to be in accord with the facts.  He was sharply criticized for his statement by many of our metropolitan newspapers, by many men who prided themselves on being self-made, and by many other men who never took the trouble to examine the trend of industrial change or the actual facts concerning industrial opportunities.  As everyone who is acquainted with these facts now knows, the proportion of wage-earners in urban industries, in the mines, and on the railroads, that can expect to become owners or directors of industry, is very small.  Certainly, it is not great than 10%.  This is simply the expression of a mathematical relation.  If not more than 10% of those engaged in industry occupy, or tend to occupy, proprietary and directive positions, it is obvious that the other 90% must, at any given time, occupy a subordinate and wage-earning position.

It is true that a large proportion, or even all of the wage-earners, might, until past middle age, indulge the hop of someday being included in the fortunate minority who rise to positions of ownership and direction.  So long as they cling to this hope, they would have the viewpoint, and practice the industrial virtues of persons who had the certain assurance of reaching that goal.  Even though the hope were an illusion, it would, so long as it were cherished, produce the beneficent effects in the mind of the wage-earner.

However, the fact is that no such hope or thought affects, for any considerable time, or to any effective extent, the minds of the great majority of wage-earners.  It is only the exceptionally energetic, the exceptionally able, and the exceptionally ambitious, who look forward to the time when they will become business men, and whose activities and consciousness during their wage-earning period are notably determined by this prospect.  The great majority think of themselves as likely to continue as wage-earners during all their working lives.  Their attitude toward their jobs and toward the industrial system is determined accordingly.

Obviously, the average worker would be interested in his work if our industrial system were reorganized in such a fashion that the majority were owners of the instruments of production.  The most desirable and most democratic arrangement would be that in which the workers owned and carried on the industry in which they were engaged.  They would be at once capitalists, business men, and laborers.  This would be what is known as cooperative production, or productive cooperation.  However, such a reorganization of industry, or of any considerable part of industry, cannot be hoped for in the near future.  It would necessarily be a matter of very slow growth and accomplishment.

In the meantime, there is another method of getting the workers interested in their work, improving their status, and promoting industrial efficiency and industrial peace.  It includes a certain degree of industrial democracy.  Various names have been used to designate it, but the one which seems most appropriate is, “labor sharing in management.”  That the workers be given a share in the management of industry, means at once something more and something less than might be understood from that phrase.  Those who have studied most intelligently the problem of management sharing by labor, do not think that the average wage-earner is now capable of taking any part in either the commercial or financial operations of a business.  Buying materials, marketing the product, borrowing money, making extensions of a business enterprise, and many other of the commercial and financial activities of an industrial concern, are at present beyond the competence of the great majority of wage-earners.  Indeed, the masses of the workers have no desire to undertake such responsibilities.  On the other hand, labor sharing in management extends beyond collective bargaining and welfare activities.  To take part in determining the labor contract as regards wages, hours, and other working conditions, is an already recognized function of the trade union.  To have something to say about welfare activities, is a recognized function of those who are employed in a given shop or establishment. Neither of these forms of control is within the field of management sharing.

The nature of the field can be most clearly indicated through one or two examples.  The American Multigraph Company of Cleveland, Ohio, has, or at any rate had a few years ago, an organization of employees which was subdivided into fifteen working committees.  Each of the committees had charge of a task which involved a certain measure of workers’ control.  Some of them had to do with one or other phase of the labor contract; others, with shop conditions; still others, with entertainment and welfare activities.  Other sub-committees dealt with production control, improvements in the company product, time and motion study, spoiled work, machinery and tools, sales cooperation, and the economy of the eight hour day.  All subjects specified in the last sentence come properly under the head of labor sharing in management.  They deal with the management of production, with the production department of the industry.  They are all matters in which the employees have a direct interest, and about which they may be assumed to have some knowledge which could be utilized with advantage by the responsible management of the enterprise.

Another example is found in the experiment inaugurated some three or four years ago in the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad shops at Glenwood, PA.  A committee representing the Machinists’ Union met regularly and frequently with a committee representing the management of the shops.  The arrangement was entered into as an experiment in cooperation between employer and employee for the benefit of both.  The two primary ends were to increase the number of days’ employment per year, and to reduce waste in production.  The precise method by which these aims were pursued is necessarily technical and need not be described here.  What is important to note, is the spirit and the results.  It is to be kept in mind that the cooperating committee representing the workers was drawn from, and selected by the regular trade union.  No “employee representation” plan, nor “company union” plan was thought necessary to the success of the project.  It was the regular union, which embraced most of the employees in the shops, that joined with management in the experiment.  Indeed, the initiative came from the union, which employed an industrial engineer to work out the plan of cooperation with the management.  When the plan was put into operation, it naturally had the good will of the workers.  The two committees, therefore, met in a spirit of cooperation, not in a spirit of opposition.  And they have continued to meet in that spirit.

With regard to the results, the experience at Glenwood proved so satisfactory that it has been extended to all the forty-five shop centers on the B&O system.  It has also been adopted by the Canadian National Railways.  In an address delivered a few months ago, Mr. Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Company, said:  “I believe that it has now been fully demonstrated that the cooperative plan which the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad has put into effect, in cooperation with its shop employees, and with the support of their respective unions, is no longer an experiment.  It has more than justified itself from many different angles.  It is now a part of the definitely adopted policy of the Baltimore and Ohio Company, and I have a feeling that we have yet not begun to realize the potential possibilities of the plan.”

Some idea of the possibilities of labor participation in the operative, or productive side of industrial management can be obtained from certain figures submitted by Mr. Willard.  The number of suggestions concerning various phases of management, which were brought into the meetings of the joint committee, was 5272.  Of these, no less than 3800 were adopted.  All this happened within a space of eight months.  While Mr. Willard did not specify what proportion of the five thousand and odd suggestions came from the employees, we may safely assume that it was at least one-half of the total number.  This fact alone is convincing testimony of the amount of interest which the plan has aroused in the workers.

The theory of labor sharing in management rests upon some of the most fundamental desires and capacities of human nature.  A vast majority of persons desire to exercise some controlling influence over their environment.  There is some directive, initiative, creative capacity in every normal human being.  The industrial population is not sharply divided into two classes, one possessing all the directive capacity, the other possessing merely the capacity to carry out orders.  The wage-earners have directive talents as well as talents to obey.  They have potencies to become something more than animated instruments of production.  If their directive capacities do not obtain some opportunity for expression they naturally remain relatively uninterested in their work.  When their directive and creative faculties are exercised, their interest is necessarily aroused, and their efficiency increased.

This does not mean that the average wage-earner is as capable of directing industry, or any of its operations, as the average employer, or industrial superintendent.  It is not necessary to prove or disprove this hypothesis.  All that is here contended is that the majority of workers possess some directive capacity, and have some desire to exercise that capacity.

These facts have been strangely ignored by the majority of employers.  Thus, they have deprived themselves of the benefits which they might have obtained through the assistance and cooperation of the rank and file of their employees.  The statement of Dr. Royal Meeker, for many years United States Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is worth quoting on this point:  “I insist that the management, even scientific management, has not a monopoly of all the brains in the establishment….As a worker and a student, I feel that there is a tremendous, latent, creative force in the workers of today, which is not being utilized at all….Here is a vast source of industrial power, which has been cut off, isolated, by the transformation of little business into big business.  It will be difficult to tap this source, but tap it we must, if we are to continue anything resembling the present organization, with its large scale production.  The good will of the workers is a much more potent force in making for industrial efficiency than all the scientific management formulas and systems of production.”

We may sum up as follows the benefits that may reasonably be looked for from labor sharing in management:  through the exercise of their directive and creative faculties, the workers will acquire greater consciousness of their dignity, and greater self-respect; out of this will necessarily come interest in their work, and a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the employing concern.  The merely business relation, the “cash nexus” between employer and employee will be supplanted by a human relation, which will make the later feel more like a partner, and less like an antagonist of the former.  The employer will gain in pecuniary welfare and peace of mind; while the whole community will be benefited through a larger and more efficient production.

So much for that measure of industrial democracy which is possible in the productive operations of industry.  All that has been said in the last few pages refers to the shop..  Is it possible to carry industrial democracy into the wider field of commercial and financial management?  Undoubtedly it is, but the method by which, and the extent to which this can be accomplished, are maters upon which it is impossible to speak with any degree of confidence.  The reason is lack of experience.  Very few industrial corporations have admitted the wage-earner to membership in the board of directors.  Even where this policy has been adopted, the employee numbers have always been in a small minority.  Nevertheless, it is correct to say that the presence of even one wage-earner on the board of directors of a corporation exemplifies to some degree the principle of industrial democracy in the supreme management.

More ambitious and thoroughgoing plans of democracy in the supreme direction of industry have been advocated by various persons and organizations.  The one which is best known in the United States is the so-called Plumb Plan.  In its original form, it was proposed by the late Mr. Glenn E. Plumb for the solution of the railway problem.  Its main features can be stated very briefly.  The ownership of the railroads should be vested in the government of the United States.  Their operation should be conducted by a board consisting of fifteen persons, five of whom should represent the federal government; five, the executive employees; and five, the subordinate employees.  All matters of policy, including the determination of wages and salaries and the fixing of charges for carrying freight and passengers, would be in the control of this board.  The annual surplus which remained after wages, salaries, interest on the government’s investment, and all other charges had been paid, would be divided into two equal parts, one half going to the treasury of the railroad management, and one half to be distributed as a dividend to both classes of employees.  The share going into the railroad treasury would be used for betterments and extensions.  If, in any year, the railroad’s share of the surplus should exceed 5% of operating revenues, the excess would be utilized for the reduction of freight and passenger rates.  In this way, the interests of the consumers would receive consideration.

Many who believe in government ownership and operation of railroads have objected to this plan on the ground that it provides, in effect, too much industrial democracy.  The employees, executive and subordinate, would have two-thirds of the membership of the board of directors.  Therefore, they would be in a position to raise wages and salaries indefinitely.  In reply to this objection, Mr. Plumb contended that he had provided against this danger by the provision that the executive, or managerial, employees should receive a larger share of the surplus profits than the subordinate employees.  Now it is conceivable that the share of the former should be so much greater than the share of the latter, that the former would be more interested in bringing about a surplus than they would in raising their salaries.  But this contention supposes such a great discrepancy between the rates at which the two classes would participate in the surplus, that the proposal would seem to be unworkable.  It is practically certain that the executive employees would be more interested in joining with the subordinate employees to vote both classes higher pay than they would in keeping down wages and salaries for the sake of providing a surplus in which their share would be proportionately greater than that of the subordinate employees.

Here, then, we have the difficulty which confronts any plan of industrial democracy in the supreme direction of a business concern.  Either capital or labor must have the majority of the membership in the board of directors; or the two factors must be equally represented; or representatives of the public must be admitted as an impartial element to hold the balance even between the groups representing, respectively, capital and labor.  If labor controls the board of directors, it will be tempted to raise wages and salaries at the expense of interest and dividends, and even at the expense of the consumer.  If capital is in control, it strives to keep down wages and salaries, and to get as much as possible from the consumer for the sake of interest, dividends, and profits.  The supposition that the power of labor and capital might be equal on the board of directors, does not seem to be practical, at least as a permanent arrangement.  The introduction of a mediating and balancing element in the form of members appointed by public authority, would seem to meet the difficulty.  And it would have the very important advantage of so directing the policies of the corporation as to take some account of the interests of the consumer. 

So far as government owned industries are concerned, the problem is comparatively simple.  In the case of the railroads, for example, the board of directors proposed by Mr. Plumb should be reorganized.  Since government members represent at the same time the government as capitalist, and the people as consumers, they should comprise a majority of the board.  To be sure, the objection may be made that the interest of consumer plus the interest of the government as investor, would outweigh in the minds of the government members, the welfare of the employees.  Quite true; nevertheless, the employees would be likely to get far more consideration from such a group than they would obtain from the capitalist majority in a board of directors having control of a private corporation.  At any rate, the only alternative is that of giving the majority control to labor.  Some day in the future that may be wise, but at present it seems to us, to say the least, premature.

Mr. Plumb’s proposal for industrial democracy in privately owned corporations has many excellent features, not the least of which his recognizing that the employees have a substantial claim upon and interest in the concern by which they are employed.  Nevertheless, the plan has the same defect as that which inheres in his plan for the railroads.  That is, it would give majority control and, indeed, overwhelming majority control to the employees.  In the nature of things, and in the nature of industry, there may, indeed, be no decisive reason why dominant labor control is any worse than dominant capitalist control.  Each will be tempted to use its power for its own ends.  The interests of the investor are no more important than the interests of the laborer.  Possibly human welfare would suffer no more as a result of labor control than as a result of capitalist control.  Nevertheless, any scheme of industrial democracy which proposes to transfer the dominant control from capital to labor, has no hope of realization in the near future.   If it comes, it will appear as a development of a gradual process.

It is worthwhile to repeat, at this point, the statement that in private corporations, capital, as well as labor, might be prevented from exercising dominant control through the presence on the board of directors of persons appointed by public authority.  It is likewise worthwhile to stress again the fact that this public group would have an important function to perform in safeguarding the interests of the consumers.

So long as capital remains in the hands of persons who are distinct from the wage-earners, there is no likelihood that the latter will obtain dominant control of industry.  The greatest degree of industrial democracy that can be hoped for is the presence on the board of directors of a sufficient number of labor representatives to form, in conjunction with the representatives of the public, a majority of the board.  If the public is unrepresented, then the labor members will undoubtedly remain a minority for a long time to come, in any experiment that is likely to be made.  Even this minority representation would constitute a degree of industrial democracy.  And it would be a vast improvement over the existing condition, in which labor is scarcely ever represented on boards of directors.  In any deliberative body, the presence of even one person who can set forth intelligently the needs and viewpoint of an important group of persons, is a great advantage to that group.

It has been asserted above that in private corporations, whose boards of directors include no representatives of the public, capitalist control will remain dominant.  However, it is possible to make this control ultimate and conditional, instead of immediate and continuous.  In that case, the general and normal control of the business would be in the hands of the employees.  Something of this kind is exemplified in the operation of the Dennison Manufacturing Company at Farmingham, MA.  In that arrangement, the immediate control is carried on by those managerial employees who have been with the Company at least five years.  The capitalist shareholders exercise no immediate control, but they receive a guarantee and cumulative dividend of 8%.  If, at the end of any three year period, their dividends have not averaged 8%, they resume active control.

The theory of this arrangement seems to be that capital, as such, has no right to more than that rate of interest which is sufficient to induce men to invest their money in, and take the risk of a given industrial enterprise.  The profits which remain after interest, wages, and all other charges have been met, are distributed among the managerial employees.  This plan relates rewards to functions, distributes surplus profits among those whose labor or ability is responsible for creating the profits.  The stockholder, who is also a member of the managerial group shares in the profits, but as a worker, not as an owner of capital.

This seems to be a more scientific and more efficient plan of industrial government than that which exists in the ordinary corporations.  It gives to the capitalist, as such, all that is necessary to induce him to continue his function as capitalist, and it gives the contingent and variable surplus to those who have the power to produce the surplus.  Thus it provides the strongest incentive to productiveness and efficiency.  It exemplifies the principle of industrial democracy to a safe and practical degree.  While the control of the Dennison Company is exercised by only a small proportion of employees, there is no reason why it should not be extended, according as conditions warrant, to the majority, or even to the entire body of employees.

The Catholic viewpoint of industrial democracy has received no explicit mention in the foregoing pages.  Nevertheless, it has been implicit in the whole discussion.  No feature of industrial democracy, advocated or discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, is contrary to Catholic ethical or social principles.  The complete, or even the dominant control of industry by the capitalistic element is not an article of Catholic faith or morals.  Government ownership and operation of railroads is not opposed to Catholic doctrine.  The presence of government representatives on the boards of directors of corporations runs counter to no principle of Catholic moral teaching.  The same may be said of the proposal to limit the reward of the capitalist, as such, to a fair rate of interest.  According to Catholic moral teaching, the money lender has a right to only a fair, or moderate, rate of interest.  Why then, should the money investor have a right to any greater rate, except to the extent necessary to protect him against the greater risk?

Indeed, one might go further, and say that the spirit which animates many of the current proposals for industrial democracy is more in harmony with Catholic teaching than the theory and practice of complete capitalist control.  The system of industry and industrial control which flourished in the Middle Ages, was the Guild System.  In that period, Catholic social principles exercised a greater influence over economic arrangements than they have exercised at any other time in history.  The Guild System arose and flourished, not merely in a society which was dominated by Catholic principles, but under the positive guidance and fostering care of the Church.  Now the Guild System was essentially a system of labor control.  The instruments of production were not owned by a separate, capitalist class, nor by any class that could properly be called capitalistic.  They were owned by the men who operated them.  Whatever of negotiation and trading was involved in carrying on productive enterprises, was conducted by the artisan-owners.  Appropriate here is the characterization of that system, and that time, by Professor E.R.A. Seligman:  “It was a period of supremacy of labor over capital, and the master worked beside the artisan.”

The industrial democracy of the guild system cannot be restored in this day of greater machinery and greater corporations.  But the spirit of that earlier and saner period can be made to function again in the modern system.  It can express itself through labor sharing in shop management, through labor membership in boards of directors, through labor control which protects adequately the interests of the capitalists, as in the Dennison plan, and through cooperative ownership and management of the instruments of production.  While the last named system has received no mention in the foregoing pages, it would realize a higher form of industrial democracy than any of the plans that have been discussed.  And it would be in accord with the dictum of Pope Leo XIII:  “The law, therefore, should favor ownership, and its policy should be to induce as many people as possible to become owners.”

• Msgr. John Ryan, The Rossi-Bryn Company, 1925.  Washington, D.C.  As in J.F. Leibell, Readings in Ethics, p. 646-661.
   
  Democracy means rule by the people.  As we all know, it generally describes a popular rule in political government.  A democratic state is one in which the people make and execute the laws, either directly, or through elected representatives.  Its opposite is an autocratic state, in which government is in the hands of a king, who either rules alone, or with the assistance of a small, privileged class.  Both the king and the privileged, or aristocratic group obtain their political power by inheritance, not by commission from the people. 
  Democracy in industry, or industrial democracy, carries over the idea of popular rule from the political field to the industrial field.  In general, it means direction and control of industry by the people.  At least, that is the significance of the words themselves.  In actual use, the phrase has many and various significations.  At the one extreme, it has been used as a synonym of Socialism, or Collectivism; at the other extreme, it has been applied to collective bargaining.  In other words, some persons understand by industrial democracy the ownership and operation of the instruments of production by the democratic state, the democratic government, the people acting through their political representatives; while other persons apply the phrase to that arrangement by which the workers, through their chosen representatives, have a share in making the labor contract, and in determining the conditions of employment.  Those who use the term in the former sense are Socialists; those who use it in the latter sense are trade unionists.
  Neither of these uses of industrial democracy is necessarily wrong.  A Socialist organization of industry would be government of industry by the people, at least ultimately and fundamentally.  Determination of wages, hours, and other employment conditions, is partial popular government of industry within certain limits; that is, with regard to the labor contract.  Such popular control through the labor union does not touch the ownership of the instruments of production, nor the direction of industrial operations.  Nevertheless, it includes a degree of industrial operations.
  As the term has come to be used, therefore, industrial democracy is a relative thing.  It means, or may mean, simply a greater degree of popular control than has heretofore existed in our industrial system.  In every use of the phrase, however, popular control means control by the employees, or wage-earners.  This is seen even in the mildest acceptation of the phrase, namely, the sense in which hit is used by trade unionists.
  The industrial democracy that I intend to discuss is considerably less than Socialism, and considerably more than collective bargaining, or trade union agreements.  Socialism is impracticable and undesirable.  Collective bargaining is insufficient.  Socialism is now accepted by such a small number of persons that it does not come within the scope of practical consideration.  The vast majority of American wage-earners do not believe in Socialism, and are very unlikely to accept it in the near future.  On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the members of trade unions are apparently satisfied with that degree of industrial democracy which is embraced in the concept of collective bargaining.  In my opinion, this amount of industrial democracy is inadequate, either to protect the interests of the wage-earners, to secure industrial efficiency, or to safeguard industrial peace.  It is not a solution, even a temporary solution, of our greatest industrial problem.
  Trade unionism, even though it include all the control which the most thorough conception of collective bargaining can comprehend, cannot give adequate protection to the masses of the wage-earners.  It has never been extended to more than a small minority of all those who work for wages, and I is not likely to take in the majority for a long time to come.  At least there is nothing in the present trend of industrial relations to indicate that the majority will become members of the labor unions in the next twenty-five years.
  Even if all the wage-earners were now organized, the methods and policies of the labor union would not bring about industrial efficiency or industrial peace.  The reason for this is to be found in the industrial antagonisms which would necessarily follow complete organization of labor into unions.  From its very nature, the labor union is a fighting organization.  Its primary aim is to secure for its members a larger share of the product of industry, and better working conditions in the matter of hours, shop arrangements, etc.  On the other hand, the employer finds it to his interest, or thinks so, to oppose the efforts of the union in all these directions.  Higher wages, a shorter working day and improvement in working conditions mean for the employer reduced profits.  At any rate, that is what he believes, and very often rightly believes.  We need not stop here to consider the “economy of high wages,” nor the general contention that the shorter working day and improved shop conditions are for the interest of the employer, as well as employee.  This theory is true only within certain limits.  Anyhow, it is not accepted by more than a small percent of employers.
  Therefore, the trade union meets the employer, or the association of employers, on a basis and in a spirit of combat, not of cooperation.  When the two groups come together for the purpose of making a trade agreement, each strives to gain as much and to concede as little as it can.  Employer and employee have, indeed, certain common interests.  In general, it is good for both that industrial operations should go on without interruption and that the joint product should be as large as possible.  The greater the product, the larger will be the amount to be divided.  Nevertheless, the diversity of interests is more important, or at least always seems so, than the community of interests.  The manner in which the product shall be divided between the two groups seems of much greater consequence than the size of the product.  Hence, when the groups are making a bargain both lay stress upon the division of the product, both emphasize diversity of interests rather than community of interests.  If they fail to agree, there is a strike, with consequent loss to both parties.  If they effect an agreement, one or the other, or both, very often believe that they have not obtained all that was their due.  This condition does not make for industrial contentment, or industrial peace.
  From the viewpoint of industrial efficiency, the whole condition may be summed up in the statement that the worker is not interested in his work.  In very many industries, particularly in the great industries owned by corporations, the majority of the employees have little or no thought of the prosperity of the concern that employs them.  What they are interested in primarily, is their jobs.  The fear that if they do not turn out a reasonable amount of work the product will be insufficient to afford them the wages which have been agreed upon, seldom affects them, or determines the rate or quality of their efforts.  They assume that the product will be sufficient to provide their remuneration, and they scarcely ever fear that their employing concern will have to shut down because of their failure to turn out a larger daily product.  The thought that they are fundamentally cooperating with the employer in a common enterprise does not often enter the minds of the workers, or if it does, it has very little influence over their attitude toward their tasks.
  The worker’s lack of interest in his work may be considered with advantage from another viewpoint.  In our great urban industries, on the railroads, and in the mines, the industrial population is rather sharply divided into two groups.  On the one hand is a small number of persons who own the instruments of production, and direct their operation.  On the other hand is the vast majority who neither own nor direct.  They merely carry out orders.  Since they do not own and do not direct, they have little or no conscious interest in the fortunes of the concern that employs them.  They are interested only in holding their jobs, and in obtaining the best conditions of employment that they can get from the employer.
  If all wage-earners had some hope of becoming owners, or partial owners, of the instruments of production, they would necessarily be interested in something more than their jobs and their working conditions.  If they looked forward to a time when they would share in the ownership of the concern that employs them, they would necessarily be interested in the prosperity of that concern.  If each worker expected to become the owner and director of a business of his own, he would be interested in the success of his employer’s business, because he would be moved by the business man’s viewpoint.  He would look upon his employee function as temporary, as subordinate to, and as a preparation for his function as director of industry.  In such conditions, the diversity of interests between employer and employee would be minimized in the consciousness of both.  Most of the emphasis would be placed upon their common interests.  The employee would be more interested in saving his money, in turning out a larger product, and in acquiring the knowledge necessary for his later activity as an owner and operator of some industry or business.
  Many years ago, that psychology and that hope were possessed by a large proportion of American wage-earners.  Indeed, the American industrial tradition has, until comparatively recent years, included the belief that almost any wage-earner, who worked hard, tried to acquire industrial knowledge, and saved  his money, had a solid hope of becoming something more than a wage-earner, long before he reached the end of his working days.  Some twenty years ago, John Mitchell, who was for many years the successful leader of the Mine Workers’ Union, declared that 90% of American wage-earners had reconciled themselves to the prospect of remaining such all their lives.  In effect, Mr. Mitchell declared that the American industrial traditions had ceased to be in accord with the facts.  He was sharply criticized for his statement by many of our metropolitan newspapers, by many men who prided themselves on being self-made, and by many other men who never took the trouble to examine the trend of industrial change or the actual facts concerning industrial opportunities.  As everyone who is acquainted with these facts now knows, the proportion of wage-earners in urban industries, in the mines, and on the railroads, that can expect to become owners or directors of industry, is very small.  Certainly, it is not great than 10%.  This is simply the expression of a mathematical relation.  If not more than 10% of those engaged in industry occupy, or tend to occupy, proprietary and directive positions, it is obvious that the other 90% must, at any given time, occupy a subordinate and wage-earning position.
  It is true that a large proportion, or even all of the wage-earners, might, until past middle age, indulge the hop of someday being included in the fortunate minority who rise to positions of ownership and direction.  So long as they cling to this hope, they would have the viewpoint, and practice the industrial virtues of persons who had the certain assurance of reaching that goal.  Even though the hope were an illusion, it would, so long as it were cherished, produce the beneficent effects in the mind of the wage-earner.
  However, the fact is that no such hope or thought affects, for any considerable time, or to any effective extent, the minds of the great majority of wage-earners.  It is only the exceptionally energetic, the exceptionally able, and the exceptionally ambitious, who look forward to the time when they will become business men, and whose activities and consciousness during their wage-earning period are notably determined by this prospect.  The great majority think of themselves as likely to continue as wage-earners during all their working lives.  Their attitude toward their jobs and toward the industrial system is determined accordingly.
  Obviously, the average worker would be interested in his work if our industrial system were reorganized in such a fashion that the majority were owners of the instruments of production.  The most desirable and most democratic arrangement would be that in which the workers owned and carried on the industry in which they were engaged.  They would be at once capitalists, business men, and laborers.  This would be what is known as cooperative production, or productive cooperation.  However, such a reorganization of industry, or of any considerable part of industry, cannot be hoped for in the near future.  It would necessarily be a matter of very slow growth and accomplishment.
  In the meantime, there is another method of getting the workers interested in their work, improving their status, and promoting industrial efficiency and industrial peace.  It includes a certain degree of industrial democracy.  Various names have been used to designate it, but the one which seems most appropriate is, “labor sharing in management.”  That the workers be given a share in the management of industry, means at once something more and something less than might be understood from that phrase.  Those who have studied most intelligently the problem of management sharing by labor, do not think that the average wage-earner is now capable of taking any part in either the commercial or financial operations of a business.  Buying materials, marketing the product, borrowing money, making extensions of a business enterprise, and many other of the commercial and financial activities of an industrial concern, are at present beyond the competence of the great majority of wage-earners.  Indeed, the masses of the workers have no desire to undertake such responsibilities.  On the other hand, labor sharing in management extends beyond collective bargaining and welfare activities.  To take part in determining the labor contract as regards wages, hours, and other working conditions, is an already recognized function of the trade union.  To have something to say about welfare activities, is a recognized function of those who are employed in a given shop or establishment. Neither of these forms of control is within the field of management sharing.
  The nature of the field can be most clearly indicated through one or two examples.  The American Multigraph Company of Cleveland, Ohio, has, or at any rate had a few years ago, an organization of employees which was subdivided into fifteen working committees.  Each of the committees had charge of a task which involved a certain measure of workers’ control.  Some of them had to do with one or other phase of the labor contract; others, with shop conditions; still others, with entertainment and welfare activities.  Other sub-committees dealt with production control, improvements in the company product, time and motion study, spoiled work, machinery and tools, sales cooperation, and the economy of the eight hour day.  All subjects specified in the last sentence come properly under the head of labor sharing in management.  They deal with the management of production, with the production department of the industry.  They are all matters in which the employees have a direct interest, and about which they may be assumed to have some knowledge which could be utilized with advantage by the responsible management of the enterprise.
  Another example is found in the experiment inaugurated some three or four years ago in the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad shops at Glenwood, PA.  A committee representing the Machinists’ Union met regularly and frequently with a committee representing the management of the shops.  The arrangement was entered into as an experiment in cooperation between employer and employee for the benefit of both.  The two primary ends were to increase the number of days’ employment per year, and to reduce waste in production.  The precise method by which these aims were pursued is necessarily technical and need not be described here.  What is important to note, is the spirit and the results.  It is to be kept in mind that the cooperating committee representing the workers was drawn from, and selected by the regular trade union.  No “employee representation” plan, nor “company union” plan was thought necessary to the success of the project.  It was the regular union, which embraced most of the employees in the shops, that joined with management in the experiment.  Indeed, the initiative came from the union, which employed an industrial engineer to work out the plan of cooperation with the management.  When the plan was put into operation, it naturally had the good will of the workers.  The two committees, therefore, met in a spirit of cooperation, not in a spirit of opposition.  And they have continued to meet in that spirit.
  With regard to the results, the experience at Glenwood proved so satisfactory that it has been extended to all the forty-five shop centers on the B&O system.  It has also been adopted by the Canadian National Railways.  In an address delivered a few months ago, Mr. Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Company, said:  “I believe that it has now been fully demonstrated that the cooperative plan which the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad has put into effect, in cooperation with its shop employees, and with the support of their respective unions, is no longer an experiment.  It has more than justified itself from many different angles.  It is now a part of the definitely adopted policy of the Baltimore and Ohio Company, and I have a feeling that we have yet not begun to realize the potential possibilities of the plan.”
  Some idea of the possibilities of labor participation in the operative, or productive side of industrial management can be obtained from certain figures submitted by Mr. Willard.  The number of suggestions concerning various phases of management, which were brought into the meetings of the joint committee, was 5272.  Of these, no less than 3800 were adopted.  All this happened within a space of eight months.  While Mr. Willard did not specify what proportion of the five thousand and odd suggestions came from the employees, we may safely assume that it was at least one-half of the total number.  This fact alone is convincing testimony of the amount of interest which the plan has aroused in the workers.
  The theory of labor sharing in management rests upon some of the most fundamental desires and capacities of human nature.  A vast majority of persons desire to exercise some controlling influence over their environment.  There is some directive, initiative, creative capacity in every normal human being.  The industrial population is not sharply divided into two classes, one possessing all the directive capacity, the other possessing merely the capacity to carry out orders.  The wage-earners have directive talents as well as talents to obey.  They have potencies to become something more than animated instruments of production.  If their directive capacities do not obtain some opportunity for expression they naturally remain relatively uninterested in their work.  When their directive and creative faculties are exercised, their interest is necessarily aroused, and their efficiency increased.
  This does not mean that the average wage-earner is as capable of directing industry, or any of its operations, as the average employer, or industrial superintendent.  It is not necessary to prove or disprove this hypothesis.  All that is here contended is that the majority of workers possess some directive capacity, and have some desire to exercise that capacity.
  These facts have been strangely ignored by the majority of employers.  Thus, they have deprived themselves of the benefits which they might have obtained through the assistance and cooperation of the rank and file of their employees.  The statement of Dr. Royal Meeker, for many years United States Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is worth quoting on this point:  “I insist that the management, even scientific management, has not a monopoly of all the brains in the establishment….As a worker and a student, I feel that there is a tremendous, latent, creative force in the workers of today, which is not being utilized at all….Here is a vast source of industrial power, which has been cut off, isolated, by the transformation of little business into big business.  It will be difficult to tap this source, but tap it we must, if we are to continue anything resembling the present organization, with its large scale production.  The good will of the workers is a much more potent force in making for industrial efficiency than all the scientific management formulas and systems of production.”
  We may sum up as follows the benefits that may reasonably be looked for from labor sharing in management:  through the exercise of their directive and creative faculties, the workers will acquire greater consciousness of their dignity, and greater self-respect; out of this will necessarily come interest in their work, and a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the employing concern.  The merely business relation, the “cash nexus” between employer and employee will be supplanted by a human relation, which will make the later feel more like a partner, and less like an antagonist of the former.  The employer will gain in pecuniary welfare and peace of mind; while the whole community will be benefited through a larger and more efficient production.
  So much for that measure of industrial democracy which is possible in the productive operations of industry.  All that has been said in the last few pages refers to the shop..  Is it possible to carry industrial democracy into the wider field of commercial and financial management?  Undoubtedly it is, but the method by which, and the extent to which this can be accomplished, are maters upon which it is impossible to speak with any degree of confidence.  The reason is lack of experience.  Very few industrial corporations have admitted the wage-earner to membership in the board of directors.  Even where this policy has been adopted, the employee numbers have always been in a small minority.  Nevertheless, it is correct to say that the presence of even one wage-earner on the board of directors of a corporation exemplifies to some degree the principle of industrial democracy in the supreme management.
  More ambitious and thoroughgoing plans of democracy in the supreme direction of industry have been advocated by various persons and organizations.  The one which is best known in the United States is the so-called Plumb Plan.  In its original form, it was proposed by the late Mr. Glenn E. Plumb for the solution of the railway problem.  Its main features can be stated very briefly.  The ownership of the railroads should be vested in the government of the United States.  Their operation should be conducted by a board consisting of fifteen persons, five of whom should represent the federal government; five, the executive employees; and five, the subordinate employees.  All matters of policy, including the determination of wages and salaries and the fixing of charges for carrying freight and passengers, would be in the control of this board.  The annual surplus which remained after wages, salaries, interest on the government’s investment, and all other charges had been paid, would be divided into two equal parts, one half going to the treasury of the railroad management, and one half to be distributed as a dividend to both classes of employees.  The share going into the railroad treasury would be used for betterments and extensions.  If, in any year, the railroad’s share of the surplus should exceed 5% of operating revenues, the excess would be utilized for the reduction of freight and passenger rates.  In this way, the interests of the consumers would receive consideration.
  Many who believe in government ownership and operation of railroads have objected to this plan on the ground that it provides, in effect, too much industrial democracy.  The employees, executive and subordinate, would have two-thirds of the membership of the board of directors.  Therefore, they would be in a position to raise wages and salaries indefinitely.  In reply to this objection, Mr. Plumb contended that he had provided against this danger by the provision that the executive, or managerial, employees should receive a larger share of the surplus profits than the subordinate employees.  Now it is conceivable that the share of the former should be so much greater than the share of the latter, that the former would be more interested in bringing about a surplus than they would in raising their salaries.  But this contention supposes such a great discrepancy between the rates at which the two classes would participate in the surplus, that the proposal would seem to be unworkable.  It is practically certain that the executive employees would be more interested in joining with the subordinate employees to vote both classes higher pay than they would in keeping down wages and salaries for the sake of providing a surplus in which their share would be proportionately greater than that of the subordinate employees.
  Here, then, we have the difficulty which confronts any plan of industrial democracy in the supreme direction of a business concern.  Either capital or labor must have the majority of the membership in the board of directors; or the two factors must be equally represented; or representatives of the public must be admitted as an impartial element to hold the balance even between the groups representing, respectively, capital and labor.  If labor controls the board of directors, it will be tempted to raise wages and salaries at the expense of interest and dividends, and even at the expense of the consumer.  If capital is in control, it strives to keep down wages and salaries, and to get as much as possible from the consumer for the sake of interest, dividends, and profits.  The supposition that the power of labor and capital might be equal on the board of directors, does not seem to be practical, at least as a permanent arrangement.  The introduction of a mediating and balancing element in the form of members appointed by public authority, would seem to meet the difficulty.  And it would have the very important advantage of so directing the policies of the corporation as to take some account of the interests of the consumer. 
  So far as government owned industries are concerned, the problem is comparatively simple.  In the case of the railroads, for example, the board of directors proposed by Mr. Plumb should be reorganized.  Since government members represent at the same time the government as capitalist, and the people as consumers, they should comprise a majority of the board.  To be sure, the objection may be made that the interest of consumer plus the interest of the government as investor, would outweigh in the minds of the government members, the welfare of the employees.  Quite true; nevertheless, the employees would be likely to get far more consideration from such a group than they would obtain from the capitalist majority in a board of directors having control of a private corporation.  At any rate, the only alternative is that of giving the majority control to labor.  Some day in the future that may be wise, but at present it seems to us, to say the least, premature.
  Mr. Plumb’s proposal for industrial democracy in privately owned corporations has many excellent features, not the least of which his recognizing that the employees have a substantial claim upon and interest in the concern by which they are employed.  Nevertheless, the plan has the same defect as that which inheres in his plan for the railroads.  That is, it would give majority control and, indeed, overwhelming majority control to the employees.  In the nature of things, and in the nature of industry, there may, indeed, be no decisive reason why dominant labor control is any worse than dominant capitalist control.  Each will be tempted to use its power for its own ends.  The interests of the investor are no more important than the interests of the laborer.  Possibly human welfare would suffer no more as a result of labor control than as a result of capitalist control.  Nevertheless, any scheme of industrial democracy which proposes to transfer the dominant control from capital to labor, has no hope of realization in the near future.   If it comes, it will appear as a development of a gradual process.
  It is worthwhile to repeat, at this point, the statement that in private corporations, capital, as well as labor, might be prevented from exercising dominant control through the presence on the board of directors of persons appointed by public authority.  It is likewise worthwhile to stress again the fact that this public group would have an important function to perform in safeguarding the interests of the consumers.
  So long as capital remains in the hands of persons who are distinct from the wage-earners, there is no likelihood that the latter will obtain dominant control of industry.  The greatest degree of industrial democracy that can be hoped for is the presence on the board of directors of a sufficient number of labor representatives to form, in conjunction with the representatives of the public, a majority of the board.  If the public is unrepresented, then the labor members will undoubtedly remain a minority for a long time to come, in any experiment that is likely to be made.  Even this minority representation would constitute a degree of industrial democracy.  And it would be a vast improvement over the existing condition, in which labor is scarcely ever represented on boards of directors.  In any deliberative body, the presence of even one person who can set forth intelligently the needs and viewpoint of an important group of persons, is a great advantage to that group.
  It has been asserted above that in private corporations, whose boards of directors include no representatives of the public, capitalist control will remain dominant.  However, it is possible to make this control ultimate and conditional, instead of immediate and continuous.  In that case, the general and normal control of the business would be in the hands of the employees.  Something of this kind is exemplified in the operation of the Dennison Manufacturing Company at Farmingham, MA.  In that arrangement, the immediate control is carried on by those managerial employees who have been with the Company at least five years.  The capitalist shareholders exercise no immediate control, but they receive a guarantee and cumulative dividend of 8%.  If, at the end of any three year period, their dividends have not averaged 8%, they resume active control.
  The theory of this arrangement seems to be that capital, as such, has no right to more than that rate of interest which is sufficient to induce men to invest their money in, and take the risk of a given industrial enterprise.  The profits which remain after interest, wages, and all other charges have been met, are distributed among the managerial employees.  This plan relates rewards to functions, distributes surplus profits among those whose labor or ability is responsible for creating the profits.  The stockholder, who is also a member of the managerial group shares in the profits, but as a worker, not as an owner of capital.
  This seems to be a more scientific and more efficient plan of industrial government than that which exists in the ordinary corporations.  It gives to the capitalist, as such, all that is necessary to induce him to continue his function as capitalist, and it gives the contingent and variable surplus to those who have the power to produce the surplus.  Thus it provides the strongest incentive to productiveness and efficiency.  It exemplifies the principle of industrial democracy to a safe and practical degree.  While the control of the Dennison Company is exercised by only a small proportion of employees, there is no reason why it should not be extended, according as conditions warrant, to the majority, or even to the entire body of employees.
  The Catholic viewpoint of industrial democracy has received no explicit mention in the foregoing pages.  Nevertheless, it has been implicit in the whole discussion.  No feature of industrial democracy, advocated or discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, is contrary to Catholic ethical or social principles.  The complete, or even the dominant control of industry by the capitalistic element is not an article of Catholic faith or morals.  Government ownership and operation of railroads is not opposed to Catholic doctrine.  The presence of government representatives on the boards of directors of corporations runs counter to no principle of Catholic moral teaching.  The same may be said of the proposal to limit the reward of the capitalist, as such, to a fair rate of interest.  According to Catholic moral teaching, the money lender has a right to only a fair, or moderate, rate of interest.  Why then, should the money investor have a right to any greater rate, except to the extent necessary to protect him against the greater risk?
  Indeed, one might go further, and say that the spirit which animates many of the current proposals for industrial democracy is more in harmony with Catholic teaching than the theory and practice of complete capitalist control.  The system of industry and industrial control which flourished in the Middle Ages, was the Guild System.  In that period, Catholic social principles exercised a greater influence over economic arrangements than they have exercised at any other time in history.  The Guild System arose and flourished, not merely in a society which was dominated by Catholic principles, but under the positive guidance and fostering care of the Church.  Now the Guild System was essentially a system of labor control.  The instruments of production were not owned by a separate, capitalist class, nor by any class that could properly be called capitalistic.  They were owned by the men who operated them.  Whatever of negotiation and trading was involved in carrying on productive enterprises, was conducted by the artisan-owners.  Appropriate here is the characterization of that system, and that time, by Professor E.R.A. Seligman:  “It was a period of supremacy of labor over capital, and the master worked beside the artisan.”
  The industrial democracy of the guild system cannot be restored in this day of greater machinery and greater corporations.  But the spirit of that earlier and saner period can be made to function again in the modern system.  It can express itself through labor sharing in shop management, through labor membership in boards of directors, through labor control which protects adequately the interests of the capitalists, as in the Dennison plan, and through cooperative ownership and management of the instruments of production.  While the last named system has received no mention in the foregoing pages, it would realize a higher form of industrial democracy than any of the plans that have been discussed.  And it would be in accord with the dictum of Pope Leo XIII:  “The law, therefore, should favor ownership, and its policy should be to induce as many people as possible to become owners.”
• Msgr. John Ryan, The Rossi-Bryn Company, 1925.  Washington, D.C.  As in J.F. Leibell, Readings in Ethics, p. 646-661.